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Non-exclusive delegation to the European External Action Service 
Hylke Dijkstra 
Book chapter in T. Delreux and J. Adriaensen (eds.), The Principal-Agent model and the European 
Union (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2017) 
Abstract 
The principal-agent model assumes a functional division of labour. Principals delegate functions to 
agents, as they anticipate that the agents will implement those functions in a more credible and/or 
efficient manner. This chapter shows that there are also instances of non-exclusive delegation in the 
EU. That is, member states have delegated foreign policy functions to the European External Action 
Service, but individual member states continue to also carry out this function themselves. Cases of 
non-exclusive delegation present a challenge to the principal-agent model. First, they question the 
functional rationale behind the delegation process. Second, they question whether the hierarchical 
relationship between the principal and agent still holds. Third, they question the existence and 
relevance of an information asymmetry. 
1. Introduction 
The principal-agent model is often used to explain the relations between the EU member 
states (the principals) and the EU institutions (the agents) (Pollack 1997, 2003; Kassim and Menon 
2003; Dür and Elsig 2011; Delreux and Adriaensen, this volume). The member states delegate 
functions to the institutions, because they expect that the EU institutions can better and/or cheaper 
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carry out those functions than they themselves. The range of delegated functions is wide: from 
agenda management to chairing meetings, providing information, monitoring and enforcing 
compliance and representing the EU externally. The trouble with delegation is that the EU 
institutions typically have their own preferences and can use their information surplus and other 
resources to pursue those agendas. The member states thus have to invest in control mechanisms to 
keep the EU institutions honest. 
Specialisation and a division of labour are at the heart of principal-agent models. Member 
states ‘outsource’ functions to the EU institutions, because they no longer want to carry out those 
functions ‘in-house’ or because they do not trust the other member states to carry out those 
functions (Tallberg 2002: 25). Member states thus benefit from delegation. At the same time, 
specialisation and the division of labour allow the EU institutions some influence. They can use 
their delegated powers and resources at the expense of the membership. Precisely because member 
states have outsourced functions, they no longer have full control over them. This logic of a 
division of labour works well in most principal-agent studies of the European Commission, the 
European agencies, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank.  
This chapter shows that there are also instances of non-exclusive delegation in the EU. That 
is, member states delegate a function to the EU institutions, but (some of) the member states 
continue to also carry out this function themselves.  The Common Foreign and Security Policy 1
(CFSP) serves as a case. The member states have delegated to the High Representative and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) the task and resources to represent the membership 
abroad, yet they continue to conduct their own foreign policies as well.  The logic of specialisation 2
and a division of labour is therefore at best unclear. To put it somewhat strongly: if the EEAS was 
about the outsourcing of foreign policy – for reasons of functionality and efficiency – we would 
expect the member states to close their foreign services and embassies. Naturally, this has not 
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happened. The phenomenon of non-exclusive delegation is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Visualization of the principal-agent relationship and the theoretical focus 
Cases of non-exclusive delegation to EU agents present a challenge to the principal-agent 
model in multiple ways. First, they question the functional rationale behind the delegation process. 
If the member states did not delegate for reasons of specialisation and efficiency, then precisely 
what was the rationale for delegation? Second, they question whether the hierarchical relationship 
between the principal and agent still holds. If both the member states and the EEAS interact with 
external parties, we are likely to see competition for access. And rivalry is more about anarchy than 
top-down hierarchy (see Helwig, this volume). Third, they question the existence and relevance of 
an information asymmetry. If the principals continue to entertain relations with external parties, 
then perhaps there is no agency problem that justifies the use of the model. 
Rather than discarding the principal-agent model all-together, this chapter argues that cases of 
non-exclusive delegation give us an opportunity to revise the principal-agent model and to better 
delineate the boundaries of its domain of application. There is a real need to take the politics behind 
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delegation more seriously and to account for the preferences and behaviour of individual principals. 
Generally speaking, the High Representative and EEAS provide a useful function for the member 
states in terms of external representation, but this does not mean that they provide a useful function 
on every single issue for each of the member states. Post-delegation, there is equally a need to bring 
power back into the equation. Apart from micro-managing the EEAS through control mechanisms, 
strong member states may simply act through national rather than EU channels. 
The chapter provides an illustration of the effects of non-exclusive delegation by looking at 
the development of the role of the EU Delegations (or ‘EU embassies’) across the world.  These EU 3
Delegations are an integral part of the EEAS (Council Decision 2010: article 1(4)) and thus have a 
broad formal mandate in supporting the High Representative (ibid.: article 2(1)) including in the 
area of external representation (article 27(2) TEU). As a result, they often perform their functions in 
parallel to national embassies. This allows member states to act both through EU and national 
channels. Delegation is therefore non-exclusive and member states have institutional choice. In line 
with this theory, the development of the EU Delegations after the Treaty of Lisbon has been uneven 
largely as a result of national interests. Moreover, principals and agents have tried to avoid outright 
hostility, but agreeing to a division of labour has been less than straightforward. 
The emphasis is on cases of non-exclusive delegation, but there are equally instances of 
exclusive delegation in the CFSP. Many can be comfortably analysed through the principal-agent 
perspective. For example, when the High Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, there is 
a principal-agent dynamic as the chairperson typically has procedural powers and informational 
advantages over the member states (Tallberg 2006). When the EEAS prepares military options, it 
likely has an information asymmetry as well over the member states as a result of its superior 
resources (Dijkstra 2013, 2016). When the EEAS mediates between Serbia and Kosovo, cases of 
hidden action may be observed (Bergmann and Niemann 2015). The chapter, however, focuses 
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precisely on non-exclusive delegation to better understand the limits of the principal-agent model. 
The overall point is therefore that we should be careful when using the principal-agent toolkit. 
2. Theoretical puzzle: non-exclusive delegation 
In the principal-agent model, the principal delegates a function to an agent, as the principal 
expects the agent to be able to better and/or cheaper carry out that function (Delreux and 
Adriaensen, this volume). When municipality counsellors delegate waste disposal to garbage 
collection companies, it is because they do not want to get their own hands dirty. When patients see 
physicians, it is because they lack medical expertise. When shareholders appoint an executive 
board, it is because they do not have the time or the expertise to manage the company themselves. 
When the member states delegate the interpretation of EU laws to the European Court of Justice, it 
is because they do not trust each other in enforcing compliance. Outsourcing and a division of 
labour are therefore at the heart of the principal-agent model. 
This cost-benefit logic is also strongly present in scholarly studies applying the principal-
agent model to the case of the EU. Whether it concerns the Commission, Court of Justice, agencies, 
the rotating Presidency or the Council Secretariat, delegation is the result of a demand for efficiency 
and credibility, which the member states cannot or do not want to supply themselves (Pollack 1997, 
2003; Beach 2005; Tallberg 2002, 2006; Franchino 2007; Dijkstra 2010). Not all delegation within 
the EU, however, follows a functional logic. The empowerment of the European Parliament, for 
example, can be better explained by a perceived need for legitimacy (Pollack 2003; Rittberger 
2005). Yet even in the case of the European Parliament, there is some sort of a division of labour 
logic: the European Parliament has been delegated tasks, because EU legitimacy cannot be better 
supplied by another other actor.  
The principal-agent model is also increasingly used to understand the interaction between the 
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member states and the newly-created EEAS (Dijkstra 2013, 2016; Furness 2013; Kostanyan and 
Orbie 2013; Kostanyan 2014a, 2014b; Henökl 2014). This is understandable since the hierarchical 
relationship is relatively straightforward: the member states are in charge of the CFSP and the 
EEAS helps them to formulate and implement foreign policy.  The EEAS has been given 4
substantial budget and staff resources, but very few formal powers. Compared to the Commission 
and the Court of Justice, it is clearly not some sort of a trustee, which has been put at arm’s length 
of the member states, to promote some form of collective ‘European interest’. The EEAS, in many 
ways, therefore seems an ideal EU institution to study from the principal-agent perspective. 
It is important, however, to recognise that the EEAS has been delegated several functions. 
And we need to distinguish between those different functions, as the principal-agent dynamics vary 
significantly. First, the EEAS facilitates foreign policy decision-making between the member states. 
It chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, Political and Security Committee and the most underlying 
working groups. It also provides member states with information and analysis to improve decision-
making. Second, the EEAS plays a central role in crisis management and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). It drafts planning documents and it forms the liaison between the member 
states in Brussels and the CSDP operations across the globe. Third, the EEAS and its Delegations 
represent the EU towards external actors. This includes representation through ad hoc initiatives, 
diplomatic mediation, special envoys and the continuous political dialogue with external actors. 
There is no doubt that the first two functions can be comfortably studied through the lenses of 
the principal-agent model. By having EEAS officials rather than diplomats from the six-monthly 
rotating Presidency chair the foreign affairs meetings (as was the case prior to the Lisbon Treaty), 
the member states benefit from continuity, impartiality and institutional memory. Yet at the same 
time, those permanent chairs can exploit their procedural and informational advantages (Beach 
2005; Tallberg 2006; Puetter 2014). Through the delegation of CSDP functions, the member states 
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benefit from specialisation, professionalisation and more efficient negotiations (Dijkstra 2013). 
When the time pressure is high, it is better to have one actor draft the military plan. And it is better 
if the military commander takes instructions from the EEAS than from 28 ambassadors with 
opposing views. But delegation in the CSDP empowers the EEAS and the member states need to 
keep a watchful eye (Dijkstra 2016). 
This chapter focuses, however, on the third function of the EEAS: external representation. As 
the chapter will show, it is precisely in this area that the use of the principal-agent model is most 
challenging. What distinguishes external representation from the other functions is the involvement 
of external actors, such as third countries and international organisations.  This allows for the 5
possibility of non-exclusive delegation (see Figure 3.1). In the case of exclusive delegation, the 
member states delegate external representation to the EEAS. The EEAS then exclusively interacts 
with an external party. We speak of non-exclusive delegation, however, when after the delegation of 
external representation to the EEAS, individual or groups of member states continue to interact with 
the same external actors on the same topics. 
Instances of non-exclusive delegation raise several obvious challenges for the principal-agent 
model. These will be discussed in more detail below. To further specify the puzzle of non-exclusive 
delegation, however, it is first important to set out the benchmark: how does the principal-agent 
model explain the delegation of external representation to the EEAS? Once the traditional argument 
for delegation has been outlined, one can better appreciate the challenges of non-exclusive 
delegation.  
So what does the traditional principal-agent model say? Two functional arguments are often 
made when studying EU external representation. First, the EU member states are relatively small 
states which have difficulty making their mark on global affairs. As a result they have coordinated 
their national foreign policies since the 1970s to stand united. They have also delegated external 
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representation to common EU agents, including the six-monthly rotating Presidency, the European 
Commission, the EEAS and even other member states. This allows them to speak with ‘one voice’. 
Second, EU external representation allows for the pooling of resources. It is simply too expensive to 
keep a diplomatic network across the globe for most, if not all, member states. Rather than Estonia 
opening its own embassy in Windhoek, it is cheaper to act collectively through EU channels. 
Both arguments – maximizing diplomatic weight and minimizing diplomatic costs – fall in 
the category of what an early observer of EU foreign policy once called the ‘politics of 
scale’ (Ginsberg 1989). As with its economic equivalent the politics of scale logic is inherently 
functional: the member states delegate external representation to the EEAS to ensure that the EU 
speaks with ‘one voice’, makes a more significant impact globally and is cheaper in terms of 
organisation. This, in turn, benefits the membership as a whole. While acting through the EU 
structures might result in some costs – such as the need to coordinate internally and compromise, or 
the agency costs of the EEAS pursuing its own agendas – delegation ultimately takes place because 
the member states anticipate that the benefits of delegation outweigh the costs.  
Importantly, the politics of scale logic expects only instances of exclusive delegation. If the 
member states indeed want to have a single agent speaking on behalf of the Union to have a single 
voice in world politics, there is no reason for them to also entertain bilateral relations with the same 
foreign counterparts. After all, multiple voices are not necessarily a choir. It would delude all the 
benefits of delegation.  Similarly, if the member states support EU external representation, because 6
they do not want to sustain a fully-fledged global diplomatic network, it makes no sense for them to 
(keep) open their own bilateral embassies in parallel. In other words, the politics of scale approach 
fits neatly with the traditional principal-agent model. After all, the principal-agent model has many 
things to say about delegation, influence exerted by agents and the control mechanisms of member 
states. 
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If we are to follow the principal-agent model in its purest form, we would thus expect only 
cases of exclusive delegation. Instances of non-exclusive delegation would constitute a falsification 
of the theory. They present us therefore with a puzzle.  While the member states have delegated 7
external representation, they continue their own bilateral relations. In addition, the member states 
are often sitting at the same negotiations table when the EEAS interacts with foreign counterparts. 
In formal terms, one could perhaps make a distinction between speaking for the EU, ‘Europe’ or an 
individual member state (see for a discussion about the technicalities of representation in New York 
and Geneva: Laatikainen 2015; Spence 2015: 227-230). Yet in reality, a division of labour quickly 
becomes blurred. The CFSP scope is global and all-encompassing. The EEAS entertains a political 
dialogue with almost every actor on almost every topic. Furthermore, foreign counterparts are 
unlikely to make the relevant distinctions between ‘the EU’ and ‘Europe’.  
The problem of non-exclusive delegation in foreign policy is decades-old. A vivid example, 
which predates the Lisbon Treaty concerns EU representation during the Dayton Conference of 
1995. For this important summit about peace in former Yugoslavia, the member states appointed 
Carl Bildt as their representative. Bildt had previously been the EU’s envoy to former Yugoslavia 
and had diplomatic standing as the former Prime Minister of Sweden. On behalf of the EU, he even 
became one of the three co-chairman of Dayton. Yet in spite of such clear case of delegation, it did 
not prevent France and the United Kingdom (and Germany) from sitting at the very same Dayton 
negotiating table on behalf of themselves. Lead-negotiator Richard Holbrooke (1998: 242), one of 
the foreign counterparts, writes about this episode that: 
Pauline Neville-Jones and Jacques Blot told us privately that Bildt could not speak for their 
governments on certain issues. This made a mockery of both the theory and the practice of 
having a E.U. representative as co-chairman, and raised other questions. Whom did Bildt 
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speak for? And when? What, in fact, was his authority? Did he represent only the E.U. 
countries that were not there? [...] What troubled us most was the hypocrisy of the European 
Union in giving a distinguished former Prime Minister such a grandiose title, then 
undermining and hamstringing him from the outset. 
While some would probably wish to forget about this historical event, the reality is that even 
under the Lisbon Treaty the situation often remains the same. One only needs to point at the 
marginal role of the EU institutions in the G7/G20 formations. The authority of EU agents gets 
undermined continuously by member states interacting with external actors on their own behalf. In 
fact, only in very few instances of serious external representation, the High Representative and the 
EEAS have the complete authority to entertain exclusive relations and to speak about CFSP matters 
on behalf of the EU and its member states. This is, for example, very different from the common 
commercial policy, where the EU holds an exclusive competence. 
It is important to study cases of non-exclusive delegation in EU external representation as 
they present a challenge to the principal-agent model and its functional logic. It allows us to revise 
and improve the model and identify the boundaries of its domain of application. The puzzle of non-
exclusive delegation provides three challenges to the principal-agent model. First, if the member 
states do not delegate the task of EU external representation to the EEAS for reasons such as 
specialisation and the politics of scale (Delreux and Adriaensen, this volume), then precisely what 
was the reason for delegation? The politics of scale argument is about speaking with ‘one voice’ by 
means of having a single EU agent for external representation. If the member states, however, 
continue their bilateral relations or make clear to external parties that the EEAS does not speak for 
them, then why would they spend significant resources on the EEAS in the first place? 
Second, cases of non-exclusive delegation challenge the hierarchical relationship between the 
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principals and the agents. With two or more captains on the ship, we are likely to see a degree of 
rivalry between the member states and the EEAS. The time and interest of foreign counterparts is, 
for example, limited. The member states and the EEAS thus need to compete for access. Similarly, 
they will likely be in a struggle for visibility in the relevant news media. To a certain extent, we 
would thus expect a scramble for access and visibility. Such rivalry is more likely to be anarchical 
rather than hierarchical. This challenges the most fundamental aspect of the principal-agent model 
(Delreux and Adriaensen, this volume). It really makes us wonder whether we can still talk about 
principals and agents. 
Third, if relations between the EEAS and external parties are not exclusive, it significantly 
affects the potential for hidden information and hidden action. After all, the member states may 
acquire the same sort of information from foreign counterparts. This goes in particular for the large 
EU member states, which are likely to have better resources, access and information than the EU 
Delegations. Furthermore, if the member states have their own embassies in foreign countries, they 
can appoint staff to keep a watchful eye on the actions of the EEAS and its local Delegations. Such 
a control mechanism further reduces the possibilities for information asymmetry. It thus reduces the 
potential agency problem. And if there is no agency problem, or a small one at best, one needs to 
wonder what the added value is of the principal-agent model to understanding the relations between 
the member states and the EEAS.  8
3. Empirical analysis: EU Delegations and external representation 
This chapter has, so far, raised the possible problem of non-exclusive delegation in EU 
external representation. To sustain that this problem is more than an intellectual exercise, it is 
important to provide empirical evidence. This section discusses the role of the EU Delegations after 
the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009. The approximately 140 EU Delegations have been at the forefront of 
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EU external representation. Their ambiguous and largely undefined role as well as the variation 
across all these EU Delegations make them excellent test cases to analyse non-exclusive delegation. 
The section builds on academic research carried out by various scholars. The purpose is, first, to 
show that the problem of non-exclusive delegation is real and should be part of the principal-agent 
model. The second aim is to provide empirical input for the theoretical argument presented below.  
The starting point for the empirical analysis is to provide some background on the historical 
development of the EU Delegations. Already from the start of the European integration project, 
there was a need to provide permanent liaison with external actors. Prior to the Treaty of Rome of 
1957, an Office of the European Coal and Steel Community was already opened in Washington, DC 
in 1954. Information Offices were furthermore opened in potential candidate countries, such as the 
United Kingdom. During the 1960s, Offices were opened in developing countries, a practice that 
increased dramatically following decolonization and the negotiation of the Lomé agreements. By 
the late 1970s, there were Delegations in most OECD countries, developing countries and various 
international organisations (Bruter 1999; Spence 2004; European Commission 2004; Carta 2012; 
Drieskens 2012; Austermann 2014).  Delegations in major centres like Beijing and Moscow were 9
not opened until respectively 1988 and 1991. 
These Delegations were Commission Delegations. As part of the work of the Commission 
they implemented external relations policies. They were composed of Commission staff and local 
officers. They reported to the Commission. Such atypical diplomatic representation caused naturally 
some problems with protocol and accreditation. The Commission staff member appointed as Head 
of Delegation could, for example, not be called an ‘ambassador’ (Bruter 1999: 190). And there were 
serious discussions how the Commission Delegations joined international negotiations. Would the 
Commission officials join the negotiation team of the rotating EU Presidency or would they speak 
on their own behalf? Finally, in a world of sovereign states, when speaking slots or the chairs in the 
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conference room were allocated, the Commission officials typically did not get first choice (Spence 
2015: 235-236). Diplomatic life was by no means easy for these Commission Delegations. 
Any yet there was also considerable clarity. Commission Delegations were representing the 
Commission and not the EU. They could pursue Commission policy. Furthermore, the Commission 
Delegations concerned themselves mostly with the competences of the Commission. This meant 
trade and development policy. As such, there was little friction with the embassies of the member 
states. Finally, while the lack of de jure recognition undermined the position of the Commission, 
Commission Delegations typically did not have problems establishing de facto recognition on 
topics where they had competence (Jupille and Caparaso 1998). The title of the Head of Delegation 
instead of ambassador was less of a problem in practice than in theory. 
Much of this has changed following the Treaty of Lisbon. While Commission Delegations in 
many countries already had a coordination role and engaged in political dialogue, the rebranding 
into EU Delegations meant four things. First, they represent the full EU including its member states. 
Second, they have an explicit political and diplomatic role, as they service the EEAS. This means 
diplomatic outreach and information-gathering. Third, they were upgraded in terms of resources. 
For the new tasks, the EU Delegations received reinforcements. Fourth, internal EU coordination 
has become a serious and Delegation-run affair in many third countries. While Commission 
Delegations previously could make their offices available and serve the coffee, Delegation officials 
now actually chair those meetings and set the agendas. 
In other words, the development from Commission Delegations to EU Delegations was not a 
cosmetic reorganisation. It has really turned EU Delegations into relevant diplomatic actors. What 
also testifies to this is the open-ended mandate that they have received. In legal terms, they are an 
integral part of the EEAS (Council Decision 2010: article 1(4)). The EEAS, in turn, is tasked to 
support the High Representative (ibid.: article 2(1)). And the High Representative represents “the 
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Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy” (article 27(2) TEU). In other 
words, the EU Delegations have the derived authority to represent the EU in third countries and 
international organizations. Given that the CFSP – through its policies and statements – covers 
nearly every imaginable topic about all the corners of the world, this gives EU Delegations a broad 
mandate indeed. 
Few member states have downgraded their diplomatic network in spite of the delegation of 
additional authority to the EU Delegations. Several have reduced their diplomatic service, notably 
the United Kingdom, but this has been the result of the economic crisis and budget cuts. Few have 
considered the actual outsourcing of foreign policy (Balfour and Raik 2013a: 37, 2013b: 6-7). There 
are some examples of increased intra-European cooperation. The Nordic houses, which co-locate 
Nordic embassies in some 30 places around the world (Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden 2014; Balfour and Raik 2013b), are frequently mentioned. 
The ‘laptop diplomat’ holding office in another embassy is an increasing phenomenon (Rena 2013: 
72). Consular cooperation is extensive in many countries (UK House of Lords 2013: paragraphs 
47-49; Balfour and Raik 2013b). Various member states closed their embassies in Syria in 2011 in 
protest to the escalating civil war, only to relocate diplomats to the local EU Delegation. Such 
developments, significant as they may be, also stand separate from the establishment of EU 
Delegations. 
Upgrading EU Delegations has therefore resulted in an indisputable case of non-exclusive 
delegation. In various third countries and most international organisations, the member states are 
represented via national and EU channels.  The key empirical question is how does this work and 10
can we identity relevant principal-agent dilemmas? The three questions, in this respect, are why the 
member states delegated in the first place, if not for reasons of efficiency and politics of scale. To 
what extent the parallel presence of national and EU diplomatic channels challenges the hierarchical 
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nature underpinning the relation between principals and agents? And whether we can still speak of 
an information asymmetry and a real agency problem? 
3.1. The politics of delegation 
One of the key observations is the variation in how Commission Delegations were upgraded 
into EU Delegations. Austermann (2014) talks of ‘different speeds’ (see also chapters in Spence and 
Batora 2015). Not all Commission Delegations were turned into fully-functioning EU Delegations 
overnight. Indeed, the EEAS took its time to establish the EU Delegations in consultation with the 
member states. Such variation allows us to examine the rationale for delegation, as it allows for a 
large-N comparison. To generalise slightly: the establishment of EU Delegations has been most 
successful in countries where member states have few interests. Balfour and Raik (2013a: 44) note 
that the EU Delegations representative role “has been relatively easy to establish in less important 
and peripheral locations where member states have fewer political interests at play … The easiest 
cases are locations where one’s own country has no representation”. Washington, DC, Beijing, New 
Delhi, Moscow, Cairo, and Tokyo are considered challenging locations for EU Delegations (ibid.: 
46; Austermann 2014). 
An argument could therefore be made that non-exclusive delegation only concerns a limited 
number high-profile instances of foreign policy. And yet, even in less important countries, it is not 
necessarily about outsourcing and exclusive delegation. Balfour and Raik (2013a: 38), for example, 
underline the absence of the efficiency rationale when stating that: 
Rather than having, say, 15 embassies of EU member states in Baku or 7 in Montevideo, in 
addition to a delegation of the EU that spends much of its time and resources on coordinating 
among the member states, would it not make sense to have just one large EU [D]elegation 
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representing the whole Union and limit national missions to a minimum? [...] This is not how 
most member states’ foreign services see the relationship between national and EU diplomacy 
in the foreseeable future. 
To avoid blatant rivalry in third countries on the ground, much of the discourse has been on 
the complementary services that the EU Delegations have on offer. Balfour and Raik (2013a: 33) 
note that “the EEAS has been careful to underline that it does not aim to replace the ministries of 
foreign affairs [...] many member states have been recalling that it is not the purpose of the EEAS to 
make national diplomacies redundant”. Complementary services include systematic intra-EU 
coordination meetings and limited diplomatic reporting to the EU institutions, including the Council 
institutions, in Brussels. In other words, the uneasiness about the new relationship between the EU 
Delegations and national embassies has resulted in a situation where the EU Delegations are 
holding back and, at the same time, have not fully been resourced to fully carry out their new 
functions. 
3.2. Challenging the hierarchy 
It is worth to examine the difficult cases at bit further, as it is in those cases that EU foreign 
policy really matters. To what extent do we see rivalry between EU Delegations and embassies and 
can we still speak of a hierarchical relationship?  
Maurer (2015: 276) writes about Washington, DC as “the most important diplomatic 
representation for many countries” where “[g]aining attention of the US administration [...] makes 
for a constant diplomatic ‘beauty contest’”. While the United States is perhaps among the third 
countries supportive of having EU agents in foreign policy, as it easier to deal with one EU agent 
than with all the member states bilaterally, this is not how the member states have felt about it. 
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Maurer (2015: 281) indeed notes that member states have been suspicious of the EU Delegation 
playing a role in political and security areas. Instead, they have preferred the EU Delegation to play 
a role in intra-EU coordination at the service of the member states. Such role was also favoured by 
the first Head of the EU Delegation appointed in 2010. Other typical roles are public diplomacy 
about the EU as well as the negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. As 
Maurer (2015: 281) states “[t]he [D]elegation did not simply become an additional embassy”. 
The EU Delegation in Beijing has hardly managed to do better in terms of capitalising on the 
Lisbon reforms. Austermann (2012: 101) writes that “[d]espite the clearly upgraded political role, 
the EU Delegation cannot do away with [...] the diverging interests of member states. This makes it 
difficult to speak always with one voice in Beijing”. Member states were pleased to have the Head 
of Delegation speak about human rights, such as in the case of the detention of Ai Weiwei, but 
refused to allow him to speak on behalf of the whole EU (ibid.; Austermann 2015: 301). “When it 
comes to the external display”, Austermann (2015: 298) writes, the profile of the EU Delegation in 
Beijing is “relatively humble”. 
In addition to bilateral relations with third countries, EU Delegations play a significant role in 
several international organizations. The EU Delegation to the United Nations in New York is one of 
the most important in this respect. This has become something of a powerhouse as a result of the 
merger of different functions. The Commission Delegation had already a significant presence due to 
its development portfolio. The EU Council Liaison Office, organising 1000+ annual intra-EU 
coordination meetings at is premises, was already a pivotal player/venue prior to Lisbon. The EU 
Delegation also took gradually charge of the substantial role of the rotating EU Presidency, which 
previously represented the EU in many UN negotiations with the exception of the Security Council. 
The combination of these functions has resulted in a strong EU agent in terms of external 
representation. 
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The role of the EU Delegation in New York has been analysed extensively elsewhere 
(Drieskens 2012; Laatikainen 2015), but it is still worth making some points. First, since the EU is 
not a full member of the UN, a considerable diplomatic effort had to be made to convince the other 
UN member states that the EU Delegation (rather than the rotating Presidency) could actually speak 
and participate in the negotiations. Furthermore, the United Kingdom started a philosophical debate 
about what external representation meant leading to various detailed guidelines (Laatikainen 2015: 
198-204). Since the EU Delegation cannot provide an explanation of vote in the UN (as it does not 
vote) and lacks other formal powers, it still needs to rely on the member states under a burden-
sharing arrangement (ibid.: 205). There are also other burden-sharing or re-delegation arrangements 
due to the EU Delegation lack of resources. In short, delegation is heavily compromised.  
3.3. Hidden information and hidden action 
Finally, to what extent can the EU Delegations accumulate an information surplus over the 
member states, which the EEAS can use to exert influence? This question goes to the heart of the 
principal-agent model, which assumes that specialisation leads to information asymmetries. As I 
noted elsewhere (Dijkstra 2015, 2016; also Adriaensen 2016), it is useful to pay attention to the 
relative administrative capacity of the member states in this respect. Strong states might dedicate 
significant staff resources to certain issues to avoid dependence on the information of EU agents. 
When assessing the administrative capacity of the member states in some important third countries, 
it becomes quickly obvious that the EU Delegations are outnumbered. Table 3.1, for instance, 
shows that the EU Delegation in Washington, DC does not rival some of the larger European 
embassies in terms of staff resources. The picture is similar in other capitals, such as Beijing 
(Austermann 2014: table 3.2). 
!  18
Table 3.1. Number of accredited diplomats of key member states and the EU Delegation in 
Washington, DC. Sources: Bruter (1999) and Maurer (2015). 
Naturally, the number of diplomats is a crude indicator when considering information 
asymmetries. National diplomats are mostly in Washington, DC on national business rather than to 
control what the EU Delegation is doing. Furthermore, the size of the EU Delegation is still 
considerable bigger than the embassies of many of the smaller member states. That having been 
said, it is unlikely that the EU Delegation will easily gather more information about the host country 
on the large majority of policy dossiers than some of the much more sizeable national embassies. 
Indeed, the problem may be the other way around: that the key member states do not share enough 
information for the EEAS and the EU Delegations to do their work properly. Consequentially, there 
is a real question about the present of an informational asymmetry that allows for EEAS agency. 
This empirical section has pointed at the presence of non-exclusive delegation in the field of 
EU external representation. A closer empirical look at the EU Delegations shows three things. First, 
there is significant variation in the development of EU Delegations. Some have become EU agents 
in third countries; others have a more limited role. Second, while rivalry is never far away, most EU 
Delegations have been sensitive to the member states in order to avoid open conflict. Some sense of 
hierarchy is thus present, particularly in some of the key capitals, even if informal and not absolute. 
Washington, DC (1998) Washington, DC (2012) Difference
Germany 86 136 +50 (+58%)
United Kingdom 74 116 +42 (+57%)
France 62 56 -6 (-10%)
Italy 29 41 +12 (+41%)
Spain 39 35 -4 (-10%)
EU Delegation 22 33 +11 (+50%)
The Netherlands 36 32 -4 (-11%)
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Third, in key capitals it is difficult to see how EU Delegations can develop significant information 
surpluses as long as they remain relatively weak in terms of administrative capacity. 
4. Theoretical argument 
How can we make sense of the puzzle of non-exclusive delegation in EU external 
representation? The answer is that while many principal-agent scholars focus traditionally on the 
collectivity of member states, they should pay more attention to the individual member states and 
their behaviour (Gutner 2005; Thompson 2007; Sobol 2016). Individual member states make trade-
offs in Treaty negotiations, face incomplete contracting and uncertainty, and they engage in 
bureaucratic politics. They may support some parts of the EEAS and its Delegations, but not 
necessarily all. The level of conflict between the member states is often conveniently written out of 
principal-agent equations by assuming a so-called ‘collective principal’. Yet cases of non-exclusive 
delegation show that this approach is hardly sustainable. 
To understand non-exclusive delegation, we need to make a distinction between the multiple 
principals and the collective principal. The multiple principals perspective argues that all member 
states entertain bilateral relations with the agent. The collective principal perspective argues that the 
member states collectively entertain relations with the agent. It requires them to first solve their own 
differences before reaching out to the agent. The collective principal perspective is overwhelmingly 
used in the study of the EU and international organizations (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Lynn et al. 
2006; Hawkins et al. 2006; Moravcsik 1998). After all, it follows the formal rules. The member 
states decide collectively whether to delegate. Such decisions are often subject to consensus. 
Delegation is therefore implicitly assumed to be a positive-sum game with benefits for all member 
states. 
If delegation is, however, a positive-sum game, there is no reason to expect non-exclusive 
!  20
delegation. If it is beneficial for all member states, why would member states then continue their 
own bilateral relations with external parties? The answer is that delegation is not necessarily a 
positive-sum. The EEAS and its Delegations provide a useful illustration. As a result of the problem 
of incomplete contracting, delegation plays on multiple levels (Treaty level; Council Decision level; 
local EU Delegation level). Not everything can be decided at Treaty level, because this would make 
the contract impossibly complex. One can therefore not bring delegation to the EEAS and its 
Delegations back to a one-shot decision by the collectivity of member states in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Delegation decisions are taken continuously. 
First, it is important to underline that there have been trade-offs between the principals when 
negotiating the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty was clearly not only about the CFSP, but about a 
range of dossiers. Some were important for some individual principals, others were important for 
others. The whole package was digestible for all member states acting together as a collective 
principal. The CFSP has traditionally been part of the trade-off in such treaty negotiations (Nuttall 
2000). Elements of political union, including foreign policy, have been important for Germany, in 
particular, to make the EU more than a unidirectional transfer of money. At the same time, it is fair 
to say that several member states would not have signed up to the EEAS if it was not part of a 
broader package deal in the Lisbon Treaty. As such the process of delegation, including the 
delegation of CFSP tasks to the EEAS, is not always a positive-sum game. Delegation may result in 
negative payoffs for principals, but they accept this loss as they are compensated elsewhere. The 
result is that those principals will be actively working against the EU agent post-delegation. 
The trouble with Treaty negotiations is, secondly, that they result in incomplete contracting. 
The Lisbon Treaty was, for example, hardly precise on the CFSP agents, namely the EEAS and its 
Delegations. The details thus needed to be filled in at a later stage. This happened through a Council 
Decision in 2010. The negotiations dynamics here were different. While the Lisbon Treaty 
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established the EEAS, there was still extensive room for discussion on its scope, resources, control 
mechanisms, etc. Since the Council Decision was negotiated on its own merits and was not part of a 
package-deal, and since agreement required consensus within the collective principal, it is not 
surprising that the result was a lowest common denominator deal. That having been said, the basic 
idea that the EU Delegations around the world would get some external representation mandate was 
acceptable even for the most sceptical principals (short of the fact that it was in the Lisbon Treaty). 
The third level of negotiations was what would happen with the individual EU Delegations on 
the ground in third countries and international organisations. In some cases, there were formal 
negotiations about the division of labour (Spence 2015; Laitikanen 2015). In other cases, there were 
no negotiations but informal developments. The overall point is, however, that the individual 
principals held, once again, different preferences. While Germany was perhaps supportive of the 
whole idea of EU Delegations in the Lisbon Treaty and the Council Decision, it may have been a bit 
more sceptical of delegation to the EU Delegations in Washington, DC and Beijing. Similarly, 
Belgium, while being a proponent of the EEAS, has not closed its own embassy in Kinshasa.  
The differentiation between the Lisbon Treaty (should we have EU Delegations?), the Council 
Decision (what should EU Delegations do?), and the developments on the ground (what should the 
EU Delegation in Moscow do?), which is a logical result of the impossibility of complete 
contracting, clearly allows for instances of non-exclusive delegation.  Even if all the member states 11
in the collective principal find it useful to have an EEAS and its Delegations represent the Union 
abroad, individual principals may still not support the work of a specific EU Delegation in a 
specific country. Delegation to the EU Delegations thus gets continuously challenged by individual 
principals, which inter alia continue to pursue their own bilateral policies. Thompson (2007: 9-11) 
calls this ‘principal problems’ at the expense of ‘innocent agents’. Similarly, recent literature about 
international organisations argues that states pursue unilateral influence through international 
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organisations (Thacker 1999; Stone 2004, 2008, 2011; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Dreher and Jensen 
2007). 
Member states therefore may support the overall act of delegation to an EU agent, but not all 
the detailed instances of delegation. In such cases, individual principals pursue their own parallel 
channels of influence. The implication for the principal-agent model is that it needs to pay attention 
to rivalry and bureaucratic politics post-delegation. While bureaucratic politics is well-developed in 
the literature on political science and international relations (Downs 1964; Allison 1971; Halperin 
1974; Peters 1992; Christiansen 1997), only a few scholars in the field of the CFSP relate to it when 
discussing the EEAS and its predecessors (Dijkstra 2009, 2011; Bengtsson and Allen 2011; Adler-
Nissen 2014). From the overview above, it is clear that the EU Delegations and previously the 
Commission Delegations have been keen to avoid blatant rivalry by trying not to antagonise 
national embassies. Yet bureaucratic politics is not something one can fully avoid. It is always under 
the surface. 
To understand the governance of the CFSP and the non-exclusive delegation to the EEAS and 
its EU Delegations, one therefore needs to take the role of the individual members of a collective 
principal more seriously than is typically done in principal-agent models. The power games in 
delegation decisions are real. While individual member states might (have to) accept delegation as 
part of a collective principal, they will actively seek to work against it post-delegation. Their own 
bilateral channels with external parties are an important means. It is important to recognise, in this 
respect, that the EEAS and its EU Delegations were not about a one-shot delegation game, but that 
it is about various principal-agent instances at different levels.  
5. Conclusion 
The principal-agent model is largely about division of labour and specialisation. The 
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principals tend to delegate when they expect higher pay-offs in case an agent carries out certain 
functions. This is the functional logic which is fundamental to many of the principal-agent model 
across disciplines. It has long been recognised that bringing such functional models into the study 
of political science is not without problems (Moe 1984, 1990). And most scholars would point at 
the importance of power in the relations between principals and agents. This chapter has made a 
case for taking the role of the preferences of the multiple principals seriously when using principal-
agent models. Individual principals do not always fully benefit from a delegation contract in all 
possible instances and may challenge the agent through unilateral means. 
The subject of inquiry has been the CFSP. It is a good case, because particularly in the field of 
external representation, the functional division of labour seems absent. The member states have 
empowered the EEAS and its EU Delegations, and yet they have continued conducting their own 
foreign policies. Such instances of non-exclusive delegation question the central assumptions of the 
principal-agent model. They question the rationale for delegation. They question the hierarchical 
relationship between principals and agents. And they question whether agents are, in fact, capable 
of building up information surpluses. In consequence, instances of non-exclusive delegation do not 
only question whether the principal-agent model provides any explanatory value, but indeed also 
whether it can be employed in the first place. 
The answer to the challenge of non-exclusive delegation, this chapter has argued is in the role 
and behaviour of the individual member states. While individual principals are often written out of 
the equation due to the assumption of a collective principal (and an excessive interest of most 
rationalist scholars in formal rules), there is a clear need to understand how they contest the agent in 
the post-delegation environment, including through non-exclusive delegation. Furthermore, as the 
empirical case has shown, the establishment of the EEAS and the EU Delegations was the result of 
a number of different delegation decisions, each of which had their own principal-agent dynamics 
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and each of which was related to incomplete contracting and institutional uncertainty. 
A question that needs to be raised is whether non-exclusive delegation in the case of the 
EEAS and its EU Delegation marks a transitional period or is of a more permanent nature. This is 
important, as in logical terms cases of non-exclusive delegation are difficult to square with the 
assumptions of the principal-agent model. An argument can be made for both. We have certainly 
seen a transitional period in which roles needed to be defined and clarified. Typically once a modus 
vivendi is found, actors adjust their expectations and informally accept a certain division of labour. 
That having said, there is also a strong degree of persistence. Tensions in major world capitals are 
likely to continue between EU Delegations and the national embassies about who speaks for the EU 
and Europe. The problem of non-exclusive delegation is therefore more fundamental than simply a 
transitional phase. 
While instances of non-exclusive delegation are particularly prominent with respect to EU 
external representation – where the presence of external parties allows for rival bilateral relations – 
there is no reason to assume that these instances are restricted to this particular domain. The role of 
individual member states and the problem of incomplete contracting are by no means specific to the 
field of EU foreign policy. 
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Endnotes
 It is important that non-exclusive delegation differs from shared competences in the EU. In the 1
case of shared competences, member states can act unilaterally as long as no EU-level policy is 
adopted. Once EU-level policy is adopted, however, such policies take precedent over national 
initiatives. 
 The High Representative and the EEAS are formally separate legal entities. The EEAS “shall 2
support” the High Representative (Council Decision 2010: article 2(1); “shall be assisted” 
according to article 27(3) TEU), but also the President of the European Council and the 
Commission (ibid.: article 2(2)). Undoubtedly there is some friction between the cabinet of the 
High Representative and the EEAS, particularly following a change of guard, and this relation 
might be subject to a principal-agent analysis by itself (see also Graham 2014; Gastinger; Laloux, 
this volume on ‘collective agents’). In this chapter, however, any mention of the EEAS includes the 
High Representative.
 This chapter distinguishes between ‘delegation’ (as in an act of delegation, verb) and 3
‘Delegation’ (as in a EU Delegation [EU embassy], EU Delegations, or Delegations).
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 The horizontal relations with the European Commission and the European Parliament’s say over 4
budgetary and personnel matters complicate things (Furness 2013). Yet empirical cases are never 
perfect and principal-agent relations are far clearer in the case of the EEAS than with many other 
EU institutions. 
 Two other contributions to this volume, which study the EEAS, focus only on the intra-EU 5
relations between principals and agents (Helwig; Niemann and Planck, this volume).
 For a more detailed (and sceptical) approach to the one voice argument see contributions to 6
Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014).
 I have argued elsewhere that principals may unilaterally make administrative capacity available to 7
control the agent (Dijkstra 2015). These so-called shadow bureaucracies are essentially redundant 
and operate in parallel to the agent. Since shadow bureaucracies are part of the control mechanisms 
of the principal, they can be studied through the standard principal-agent model. The problem of 
non-exclusive delegation is, however, different. It hardly makes empirical sense to argue, for 
example, that the UK or French embassy in Washington DC is solely a mechanism to control the 
EU Delegation. A handful of diplomats in those bilateral embassies may well keep an eye on EU 
coordination. But the purpose of the embassy as such is clearly not to exclusively control the EU 
Delegation.
 See Waterman and Meier (1998) on the use of the principal-agent model in the absence of an 8
informational asymmetry. Delreux and Adriaensen (this volume) are right to treat informational 
asymmetries as a variable, but this does not mean that principal-agent models are still useful in the 
complete absence of such asymmetries.
 The various publications provide conflicting historical dates. This seems partially a result over 9
confusion about the distinction between ‘Offices’ and ‘Delegations’.
 There is an implicit bias in this chapter towards the larger member states. Indeed, many smaller 10
member states have a much smaller bilateral presence across the globe. 
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 A fourth level of delegation decisions takes place on a day-to-day basis: should the EU 11
Delegation in country X issue a statement on Y or organise an event on Z?
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